Abstract. Since Bellare and Ristenpart showed a multi-property preserving domain extension transform, the problem of the construction for multi-property hash functions has been reduced to that of the construction for multi-property compression functions. However, the Davies-Meyer compression function that is widely used for standard hash functions is not a multi-property compression function. That is, in the ideal cipher model, the Davies-Meyer compression function is collision resistant, but it is not indifferentiable from a random oracle. In this paper, we show that the compression function proposed by Lai and Massey is a multi-property compression function. In addition, we show that the simplified version of the Lai-Massey compression function is also a multi-property compression function. The use of these compression functions enables us to construct multi-property hash functions by the multi-property preserving domain extension transform.
Introduction
Cryptographic hash functions play a fundamental role in modern cryptographic protocols. Hash functions are used for data integrity in conjunction with digital signatures and message authentication codes. These applications require that hash functions satisfy the following properties: preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, and collision resistance. Another application of hash functions is an alternative to a random oracle. For example, hash functions are used to instantiate random oracles in public-key schemes such as RSA-OAEP [2] and RSA-PSS [3] . This application requires that hash functions are indistinguishable from random oracles.
Coron, Dodis, Malinaud, and Puniya [8] have formally discussed the indifferentiability of hash functions. The notion of indifferentiability was first introduced by Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein [12] , and is a stronger notion than just indistinguishability. Coron et al. have shown that the MerkleDamgård construction [9] [13] is not indifferentiable from the random oracle, and have proposed hashfunction constructions that are indifferentiable from the random oracle. Chang, Lee, Nandi, and Yung [7] have given the formal proof of indifferentiability to the constructions of Coron et al. In [7] and [8] , the collision resistance of the indifferentiable constructions were not explicitly studied.
Bellare and Ristenpart [1] have shown that the indifferentiability from the random oracle does not guarantee the collision resistance, and have proposed a multi-property preserving domain extension transform (called an MPP transform) where "multi-property" means indifferentiability and collision resistance. The MPP transform enables a constructed hash function to inherit these properties of an underlying compression function. Due to their works, the problem of the construction for multi-property hash functions was reduced to that of the construction for multi-property compression functions.
However, the Davies-Meyer compression function, which is used for popular hash functions, is not a multi-property compression function in the ideal cipher model. Namely, the Davies-Meyer compression function is collision resistant [6] , but it is not indifferentiable from a random oracle [7] [8] [10] . Therefore, it is important to construct a multi-property compression function.
In this paper, we show that the compression function proposed by Lai and Massey (called an LM compression function) [11] is a multi-property compression function. We first quantify the indifferentiability between the LM compression function and the random oracle. There are two proof methodologies for quantifying the indifferentiability. One is a methodology by Bellare and Rogaway (a game-playing proof) [4] , the other is a methodology by Chang, Lee, Nandi, and Yung [7] . To see the difference between the two methodologies, let us consider the indifferentiability of two oracles. In the methodology by Chang et al., an event must be carefully defined so that the adversary views of two oracles are identically distributed when the event does not occur. However, how to define the event is not necessarily obvious. On the other hand, the game-playing proof provides how to define an event for distinguishing the two oracles, which is called identical-until-bad. Since the notion of identical-untilbad is easy to use, we quantitatively evaluate the indifferentiability using the game-playing framework. We next quantify the collision resistance of the LM compression function because Lai and Massey did not give the formal proof of collision resistance.
We also propose the simplified version of the LM compression function, called a CP compression function where "CP" is an abbreviation of "Constant Plaintext." Although we do not think that the CP compression function is novel, the CP compression function have not been studied in terms of indifferentiability and collision resistance. We show that the CP compression function as well as the LM compression function is a multi-property compression function. Therefore, these compression functions are promising primitives for building multi-property hash functions.
Related Works
Since the Merkle-Damgård construction is a collision-resistant preserving domain extension transform, the construction of collision-resistant compression functions have attracted interest. Since the advent of Coron et al.'s paper [8] , the indifferentiability has been focused. We here summarize related works from the viewpoint of the construction for rate-1 and single-length compression functions.
Lai and Massey [11] proposed a compression function, which is studied in this paper because they did not provide any security observation. The LM compression function is based on the block cipher such that the key length is longer than the block length. Since the LM compression function requires one invocation of the block cipher and the output length is equal to the block length of the block cipher, the LM compression function is a rate-1 and single-length compression function. Parenthetically, they also proposed the different type of compression functions in [11] , but the different type of compression functions are out of scope of this paper.
Preneel, Govaerts, and Vandewalle [15] analyzed the security of 64 compression functions (PGV compression functions) in context of attacks, but did not provide any formal proof. The PGV compression functions include popular compression functions such as the Davies-Meyer compression function, the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas compression function, and the Miyaguchi-Preneel compression function. Notice that the PGV compression functions do not include the LM compression function.
Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton [6] provided a formal and quantitative treatment of all the PGV compression functions. Their proof is based on the ideal cipher model. They studied the collision resistance and the inversion resistance of the PGV compression functions, but did not study indifferentiability from a random oracle.
In [8] , the Davies-Meyer compression function is not indifferentiable from a random oracle in the ideal cipher model. In [7] [10], the PGV compression functions are not indifferentiable from a random oracle in the ideal cipher model. In [10] , a compression function such that many block ciphers are used selectively was proposed, and it was stated that the proposed compression function was implemented by the LM compression function. However, the difference between the proposed compression function and the LM compression function was not discussed.
The above related works as well as this paper are based on the ideal-cipher model. Black [5] pointed out suspicion as to the wisdom of blindly using the ideal-cipher model in proofs of security. Black showed that, given a collision-resistant hash function in the ideal cipher model, there exists a block cipher that makes the hash function collision-easy. However, as described in [5] , a pseudo-random permutation that is a weaker assumption than the ideal cipher model is insufficient for building a collision-resistant hash function. In fact, it is easy to prove that the LM compression function is not collision resistant under the pseudo-random-permutation assumption. Therefore, we employ the ideal cipher model in this paper.
Organization In Section 2, we describe notation, primitives, and definitions of the LM compression function and the CP compression function. Our discussion is based on the ideal cipher model. In Section 3, we first quantitatively argue the indifferentiability between the LM compression function and a random oracle. We next discuss the collision resistance of the LM compression function in a similar way to that of Black et al. [6] In Section 4, we quantify the indifferentiability and the collision resistance of the CP compression function in a similar way to Section 3. In Section 5, we summarize remarks.
Preliminaries

Notation and Primitives
We will write a←b to mean that a is to be set to the result of evaluating expression b, and write a $ ← A to mean that a is uniformly chosen at random from a finite set A. For algorithms A and B, A B means that A uses B as an oracle. We denote by Pr [A⇒a] the probability that an algorithm A outputs a. In addition, we denote by Pr [a : b] the probability that a predicate b is true after a was performed. We denote by Pr [b | a] the probability that b is true when a occurred. We let denote the concatenation operator on strings.
Let R be a function from a finite set X to a finite set Y. The function R is said to be a random oracle 1 if R satisfies the following equation for x ∈ {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x q } and y ∈ Y.
where |Y| is the number of elements in Y. Notice that R returns the same string for the same query. When Y = {0, 1} n , the random oracle R can be emulated by the algorithm of Fig. 1 . In Fig. 1 , the table R[x] is initialized to the special symbol ⊥, and is used for storing responses to previous queries. As queries are made, each R[x] is filled with an n-bit random string.
A block cipher is a function E from {0, 1} × {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n where, for each k ∈ {0, 1} , E (k, ·) is a permutation on {0, 1} n . When E is a block cipher, E −1 denotes its inverse, i.e., E −1 (k, y) gives the string x such that E (k, x) = y. Let Bloc( , n) be the set of all block ciphers from {0, 1} ×{0, 1} n to {0, 1} n . Choosing a random element of Bloc( , n) means that for each k ∈ {0, 1} one chooses a random permutation E (k, ·) [6] . An ideal cipher is defined as a random element of Bloc( , n). Accordingly, the ideal cipher E satisfies the following equation for each k.
where each x i is distinct, x ∈ {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x q }, and y ∈ {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y q }. Since the ideal cipher model allows an adversary to have access to both of E and E −1 , combining them simplifies description of discussion. We will use E(1, ·, ·) and E(−1, ·, ·) instead of E and E −1 here. The ideal cipher E of Bloc( , n) can be emulated by the algorithm of Fig. 2 . In Fig. 2 , E takes three inputs; α ∈ {1, −1} specifies encryption or decryption, k is an -bit key, and if α = 1 w is an n-bit plaintext, otherwise w is an n-bit ciphertext. The double dash, //, begins a comment that extends to the end of the line. The 
Definition of Compression Functions
In this paper, we first analyze security of the compression function that was proposed by Lai and Massey [11] (called an LM compression function). Although they proposed it, they did not discuss its security. Our purpose is to show that the LM compression function has good properties (exactly, indifferentiability and collision resistance). If the LM compression function has the good properties, then the MPP transform [1] allows us to construct a hash function with the good properties.
Let E be an ideal cipher in Bloc( , n) where > n. For z ∈ {0, 1} −n and x ∈ {0, 1} n , the LM compression function is defined as
In addition, we call the following function a CP compression function where CP stands for a Constant Plaintext.
where c is an n-bit public constant string, say 0 n . Although we do not think that the CP compression function is novel, the security of the CP compression function have not been studied formally. Our purpose is to show that the CP compression function has good properties. 
The LM Compression Function
Let E be the ideal cipher of Fig. 2, i. e., a function from {1, −1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n where an element of {1, −1} stands for encryption or decryption, is key length, and n is block length. The LM compression function is defined as
which is a function from {0, 1} −n × {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n . In this section, we omit the subscription LM of Eq. (1) for simplification. In hash-function contractions such as the MPP transform, z is a message block to be compressed and x is output of the preceding compression function.
Indifferentiability
To evaluate the indifferentiability from a random oracle, we introduce the advantage of an adversary against the LM compression function, which is called a pro-advantage. The pro-advantage indicates how much the LM compression function behaves like a random oracle. The pro-advantage of an adversary A is defined as Adv
The where H is the LM compression function, E is the ideal cipher, R is the random oracle, and S is a simulator. The random oracle R exposes the same interface as H, i.e., R is a function from {0, 1} −n × {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n . It is easy to implement R using a random oracle from {0, 1} to {0, 1} n . The simulator S exposes the same interface as E, and emulates E as possible. If the value of Adv pro H,S (A) is negligibly small, then it means that the adversary A cannot distinguish between the LM compression function H and the random oracle R.
We quantify the indifferentiability of the LM compression function using the game-playing framework [4] . We assume that A is an infinitely powerful adversary and A makes no pointless query such as the same query to oracles.
We start with a game G 0 as shown in Fig. 3 . In Fig. 3 , H 0 is a function from {0, 1} −n × {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n , and E 0 is a function from {1, −1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n . In line 201 and line 213, k is parsed into an ( − n)-bit string a and an n-bit string z. The flag bad in line 208 and line 218, which will be used for later discussion, does not any effect on the output of E 0 . It is easy to verify that H 0 and E 0 exactly emulate the LM compression function of Eq. (3) and the ideal cipher of Fig. 2 , respectively. Hence, we have, for any adversary A,
Note that the description of E 0 is of redundancy (e.g., line 203-206), which is helpful to compare other games. We next consider a game G 1 as shown in Fig. 4 . In Fig. 4 , R 1 exposes the same interface as H 0 , but R 1 is algorithmically equivalent to the random oracle R of Fig. 1 . The function S 1 is a simulator that we here study, and is designed to emulate the ideal cipher as possible. It follows that
for any adversary A. Therefore, the pro-advantage of Eq. (4) is rewritten as
We compare the game G 1 and a game G 2 of Fig. 5 . The function R 2 exposes the same interface as R 1 , but the algorithm of R 2 differs from that of R 1 . However, if a query is fresh, then R 2 returns an n-bit random string due to line 204, line 209, and line 220 in Fig. 5 . Hence, R 2 as well as R 1 is the random oracle. Comparing S 1 and S 2 , we see that the difference is line 204 and line 220, i.e., y←R 1 (z, x) in S 1 and y←{0, 1} n in S 2 . Both of them return a random string if a query is fresh. It follows that S 1 and S 2 are functionally equivalent. Hence, we have for any adversary A. Substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (5) yields the following equation.
We compare the game G 0 with the game G 2 . Since H 0 and R 2 are algorithmically the same, we focus on the difference between E 0 and S 2 . We easily see that the difference appears after the statement bad←true. Namely, E 0 and S 2 are identical until the flag bad sets. Using the fundamental lemma [4] , we obtain
where Pr [G 0 sets bad] denotes the probability that the flag bad in Fig. 3 is set to true in the execution of A with the game G 0 . We calculate the probability Pr [G 0 sets bad]. Since the query to H 0 turns out to be the query to E 0 , we consider only the query to E 0 . Since the flag bad appears in line 208 and line 218, we have
where
are at most i − 1. The probability that bad e is set at the i-the query is not greater than (i − 1)/2 n , and the probability that bad d is set at the i-the query is not greater than 1/(2 n − (i − 1)). Assuming thatueries are made in the execution of A with the game G 0 , we have
where we assumed that q ≤ 2 n−1 + 1. Substituting the above inequalities into Eq. (8), we obtain
Collision Resistance
In this section, we analyze the collision resistance of the LM compression function. Although Lai and Massey proposed this function, they did not evaluate its collision resistance. To quantify the difficulty of finding a collision in H, we consider the following probability, called a col-advantage of adversary B [6] .
where "Outputs collide" means that one of the following events occurs.
Since the game G 0 (= (H 0 , E 0 )) in Fig. 3 exactly emulates H and E, the col-advantage is given by
Let C i be the event that there exists j ∈ {1, 2, . .
In the game G 0 , an oracle's answer is randomly selected from a set of at least 2 n − (i − 1) because the adversary makes no pointless query. Noticing that y 0 was given in advance, we have Pr [
). Hence, we obtain
where we assumed that q ≤ 2 n−1 .
The CP Compression Function
Let E be an ideal cipher from {1, −1}×{0, 1} ×{0, 1} n to {0, 1} n as shown in Fig. 2 . For z ∈ {0, 1} −n and x ∈ {0, 1} n , the CP compression function is defined as
where c is a public constant string, say 0 n . In this section, we omit the subscription CP of Eq. (2). In hash-function contractions, z is a message block to be compressed and x is output of the preceding compression function.
In this section, we quantify the indifferentiability and the collision resistance of the CP compression function. We will observe that these properties of the CP compression function and those of the LM compression function are the same level in terms of adversary's advantage. In other words, the encryption of variable x in the LM compression function does not contribute to improving adversary's advantage.
Indifferentiability
We quantify the indifferentiability of the CP compression function in a similar way to Section 3.1. We define the pro-advantage of an adversary A as
where H is the CP compression function, E is the ideal cipher, R is the random oracle, and S is a simulator that we study here. We assume that A is an infinitely powerful adversary and A makes no pointless query. We start with a game G 3 as shown in Fig. 6 . In Fig. 6 , H 3 and E 3 exactly emulate the CP compression function of Eq. (12) and the ideal cipher of Fig. 2 , respectively. Thus, for any adversary A, we have Pr
Note that the redundant description of E 3 is helpful to compare other games. We next consider a game G 4 as shown in Fig. 7 . In Fig. 4 , R 4 exposes the same interface as H 3 , but R 4 is algorithmically equivalent to the random oracle R of Fig. 1 . The function S 4 is a simulator that we here study. It follows that Pr
for any adversary A. Therefore, the pro-advantage of Eq. (13) is rewritten as
We compare the game G 4 and a game G 5 of Fig. 8 . The function R 5 exposes the same interface as R 4 , and R 5 always returns an n-bit random string due to line 204, line 209, and line 220 in Fig. 7 . Hence, R 4 as well as R 3 is the random oracle. Comparing S 4 and S 5 , we see that line 204 and line 220 are different, but both of them return a random string if the query is fresh. Hence, S 4 and S 5 are functionally equivalent. Since G 4 and G 5 are the same for the adversary, Eq. (14) is rewritten as
The above inequality is based on the fact that E 3 and S 5 are identical until the flag bad sets. We can calculate the probability Pr [G 3 sets bad] in a similar way to Section 3.1.
The above bound is the same as Eq. (9) 
Collision Resistance
To quantify the difficulty of finding a collision in the CP compression function H, we define the col-advantage of adversary B as 
In a similar way to Section 3.2, we obtain the following bound on Adv col H (B). 
where we assumed that q ≤ 2 n−1 . The above bound is the same as Eq. (11). 
Concluding Remarks
Due to [1] , the problem of building a multi-property hash function was reduced to that of building a multi-property compression function. Hence, it is significant to build a multi-property compression function from primitives. In this paper, we employed the ideal cipher as the primitive.
We have first quantified the indifferentiability and the collision resistance of the LM compression function in the ideal cipher model. In order to distinguish between the LM compression function and the random oracle, or in order to find a collision in the LM compression function, an adversary needs about √ 2 n queries to oracles where n is output length. Next, we have analyzed the indifferentiability and the collision resistance of the CP compression function, which is a variant of the LM compression function. We have shown that the CP compression function has the same properties as the LM compression function in terms of adversary's advantage.
Although the Davies-Meyer compression function is widely used for popular hash functions such as the SHA family [14] , the Davies-Meyer compression function is not a multi-property compression function, that is, it is distinguishable from the random oracle in the ideal cipher model. In contrast, the LM compression function and the CP compression function are multi-property compression functions. Therefore, the use of these compression functions enables us to build hash functions with the same properties by the MPP transform.
